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Case No. 18130

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF

NATURE OF THE CASE
A writ of review was filed by the plaintiff, J and W Janitorial Service, to review an order of the Industrial Commission
holding it liable for compensation benefits as a result of the
death of Jeffrey Matthew Tilt, which included the payment of
statutory funeral benefits to the father of the deceased as well
as the payment of an award to the Second Injury Fund which is
mandated by statute in cases of death by industrial accident
where the deceased has no dependents.
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION
A hearing was held September 26, 1981 before an Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial Commission on the application of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Frank L. Tilt for benefits he claimed as a result of the death
of his son who was alleged to be an employee of J and W Janitorial Service at the time of his fatal accident.

On October 6,

1981 the Industrial Commission entered an order which contained
its findings that (a) the deceased was an employee of the plaintiff at the time ·of his death and was not an independent contractor;

(b) the deceased died in an accident which arose out

of his employment;

(c) the parents of the deceased were not

dependent upon him within the meaning of the compensation act
and, therefore, were entitled only to the statutory burial expenses of $1,000 as provided by Utah Code Ann.

(1953) Sec. 35-1-

81, as amended, and (d) the plaintiff was liable to the Second
Injury Fund pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

(1953} Sec. 35-1-68, as

amended, for the sum of $18,720.00 as a result of the death by
industrial accident

of an employee with no dependents from which

the Administrator of the Second Injury Fund agreed to forego
$3,000 to be deducted and payed to the father of the deceased as
additional reimbursement for burial expenses.
On October 19, 1981 the plaintiff filed a motion for review
in which it was requested that the Industrial Commission review
the transcript of the hearing and accept memoranda from the parties.

On October 28, the Commission entered its order denying

the motion for review without having requested a transcript of
the hearing.

Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the

Commission's order November 5, 1981 on the ground that the Commission had failed to review the evidence or receive memoranda
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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of law.

No ruling on the motion for reconsideration was made

within the time allowed for petitioning for review of the comrnission' s final order and plaintiff's petition was filed November 25, 1981.

On April 6, 1982 two members of the Commission

entered an order denying plaintiff's motion for reconsideration
with Commissioner Hadley dissenting after having reviewed the
evidence.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff respectfully requests that the order of the Industrial Commission be reversed on the ground that the Commission
erroniously concluded as a matter of law that the death of the
deceased arose out of or irt the course of his employment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
J and W Janitorial Service is a sole proprietorship owned
by Mr. and Mrs. Jerry Johnson.

They are engaged in the business

of contracting to provide janitorial services to the owners of
several buildings in the Salt Lake City area.

(R

35-36)

At the

time in issue here, Mr. Johnson employed three persons in addition to himself to service his janitorial accounts.

(R

36)

(These employees, including the deceased, were actually considered independent contractors by the parties themselves,

(R

36-37)

but the plaintiff has not appealed from the Commission's finding
that the deceased was a "statutory employee" for the purposes of
workmen's compensation as defined by Utah Code Ann.

(1953) Sec.

35-1-42, as amended, and he will be referred to as an employee
throughout) .
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One of the plaintiff's service contracts was with a bakery.
Every evening at approximately 7:00 p.m., plaintiff's employees
went to the bakery to clean large mixing and baking equipment
and to sweep out the premises.

(R 36)

On the average night,

the plaintiff's crew of three people finished cleaning the bakery at about L:30 a.rn.

(R

41) Among the machines they cleaned

was a large mixer about six and a half feet high, five feet wide
and five feet deep with a platform behind i t from which bakery
workers poured flour and other ingrediants, and upon which plaintiff's employees stood to sweep and hose out the tank.

(R 41)

Mr. Johnson testified that a crew of three workers which ordinarily included his father worked the bakery job and that, after
having trained them, he did not regularly go on to the job site
to supervise their work.

(R

43,48)

The deceased, Jeffrey Matthew Tilt, worked for the plaintiff
on approximately fifteen to eighteen occasions at the bakery during December 1980 and January, 1981 after which he quit his employment without explanation.

(R

38)

On the night of his death,

May 9, 1981, one member of the plaintiff's regular crew, Mr.
Johnson's father, was unavailable to work at the bakery.

(R

44)

One of Mr. Johnson'. s other crew member, Cary Dannenberg was a
close friend of the deceased and asked him to fill in that night
for Mr. Johnson's father.

(R

55)

Mr. Dannenberg, the deceased, and the third crew member,
Trevor Hildebrand, arrived at the bakery at approximately 7: 00 p.m .....
that evening.

(R 40)

(The plaintiff preferred testimony from Mr.
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Dannenberg at the hearing that the three brought beer with them
when they went to work.

The Administrative Law Judge sustained

the Second Injury Fund's objection to this evidence.

(R

56-59)

The two surviving crew members testified that they finished their
work around 2:00 a.m.

(R

59,68)

Mr. Hildebrand stated that they

decided to remain on the bakery premises rather than leave as
they usually did because they intended to spend the night outside the Salt Palace in a line of people waiting to buy concert
tickets and wanted to "kill some time" at the bakery where it
was warm.

{R 46,69)

After they finished w9rking, the deceased and Trevor
Hildebrand began playing hide and seek around the bakery and
playing with the fork lifts.
minutes later,

{R 61,70)

Approximately forty-five

{R 70) as Trevor and Cary were drinking beer,

Trevor hit Cary in the arm causing him to drop his beer bottle
and break it.

They were cleaning up the broken glass when they

heard the deceased yell from what appeared to be his position on
the platform behind the
door".

la~ge

mixer.

He asked them to "open the

Trevor reached for the button near where he was standing

which opened the door to the bakery and, by mistake, pushed an
adjacent switch which activated the mixer.

Tragically, the de-

ceased was not on the platform but was inside the mixer at the
time and was killed instantly.

(R

60,70)

Though the Administrative Law Judge sustained objections to
testimony on the subject and indicated that he would not rely on
it, the other crew members testified that the deceased had been
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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drinking beer throughout the night at work and had taken drugs.
(R 68,69,71)

Mr. Johnson and his two employees who witnessed the death
stated that they had never at any time previously seen anyone
climb down into the mixer, and had never seen anyone play
hide and seek around the mixers or on the premises at all.
65,67,70)

(R

41,

Counsel for the plaintiff attempted to examine Mr.

Tilt about whether he had ever known beforehand that any employees had consumed beer or drugs on the bakery premises, but the
Administrative Law Judge ruled that the question was irrelevant.
(R

42)

The plaintiff wished to proffer his testimony that he

had never known of any employees drinking or taking drugs on the
job, and that the one time an employee came to work under the
influence of alcohol he was sent home.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. AN INJURY WHICH OCCURS
AFTER WORKING HOURS IS COMPENSABLE ONLY WHEN THE EMPLOYEE IS
ENGAGING IN ACTIVITIES REASONABLY
INCIDENT TO HIS EMPLOYMENT.

The issue to be decided in this case is whether the deceased's death was by an accident "arising out of or in the course
of his employment" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann.
Sec. 35-1-45.

(1953)

Where, as in this instance, the facts and circum-

stances of the accident are established by the testimony of two
eyewitnesses, and are uncontradicted in every essential respect,
this court's authority on review is invoked to determine whether
the law was correctly applied to the facts of the case.
It is undisputed that the deceased's accident occurred after
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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he and his co-workers had completed their janitorial work.
In evaluating whether or not an after-hours injury on the premises of employment is compensable, Professor Arthur Larson
(hereinafter referred to as "Larson") in his treatise Workmen's
Compensation Law states the following rule at Vol. lA, Sec. 21.60
p. 5-36 and 5-40.
The course of employment, for employees
having a fixed time and place of work,
embraces a reasonable interval before and
after official working hours while the
employee is on the premises enga.ged in
preparatory or incidental acts. The rule
is not confined to activities that are
necessary; it is sufficient if they can
be said to be reasonably incidental to
the work.

*

*

*

Although a reasonable interval is allowed
before actual working time during which
an injury would normally be compensable,
if the employee merely loiters around the
work place before or after hours, the employee may be found to have been outside
the course of his employment.
Professor Larson's views are consistent with this court's
recent holding in United States Steel Corp. v. Draper, 613 P.2d
508, 509 (Utah 1980) that
The scope of one's employment includes
not only the specific duties assigned
but also those things which it should
reasonably be expected an employee would
do in connection with those duties . . .
The deceased in this case had a fixed place of work, the
bakery, and fixed time for performing his work, that is, from
7:00 p.m. when the bakery's operation was shut down until all
the routine janitorial services were performed, ordinarily at
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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approximately 1:30 a.m.

(R 41)

Given the fact that his work

had been completed for appro~imately 45 minutes (R 70), the relevant inquiry appears to be whether at the time he died the
deceased was engaging in activities "reasonably incidental" to
his work, to· use Larson's phrase, or activities "reasonably expected . ·. . in connection with those duties", as this court
has stated the rule.
The plaintiff submits that when an employee remains on the
premises of employment after working hours to "kill time" where
it is warm before standing in line overnight for concert tickets,
and where he spends that time drinking beer and playing hide and
seek, he is engaging in activities which are not reasonably related to his duties and therefore do not arise out of or in the
course of his employment.
A review of cases cited by Larson, supra, Vol lA Sec. 21.60
reveals that when an employee has remained at the workplace after
hours to change his clothes, to put away his tools, to shower, or
to close up the building, his activities are generally thought to
be incidental to his employment and resultant accidents are usually compensable.

On the other hand, where it is found that the

~

ployee remained at the workplace for purely personal reasons, and,
especially when he simply engaged in frolic for his own amusement,
it is generally held that the course of employment does not extend beyond the normal hours of employment to encompass such activity.

In the case of Trotter v. C'ou·nty of Monmouth, 144 N.J.

Super. 430, 365 A.2d 137 (1976) a county rnaintainence worker
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-8-

returned to the shop after completing his assignments for the
day but shortly before quitting time.

He saw a motorcycle

parked there which belonged to a co-worker and began riding it
on and off county property and after the time at which other
workers were dismissed by their foreman.

Workmen's compensation

coverage was held not to extend to his accident.
Similarly, in the case of Sumner v. Coe, 40 Or. App. 815,
596 P.2d 617 (Or. App. 1979) the court held that when an employee
was injured while riding after work across the employer's parking lot on the hood of a fellow worker's car,he was not engaging
in activity reasonably related to his employment, and was outside the course of his employment at the time.

The same result

was reached by the California Appellate Court in Seymour v. Setzer
Fbrest Products, 124 Ca. App. 2d 608, 268 P.2d 1084 (Cal. App.
1954) when an employee who had come to work early was injured
while visiting and chatting with other employees.

The court

concluded that because his reasons for being on the premises were
personal and were not related to any service to his employer, tne
accident which occurred was not compensable.
The fact that the fatal accident in issue here occurred after
normal working hours does not per se render the death outside the
coverage of the compensation act.

However, when it is undisputed

that the activities of the deceased at the time were in no way
reasonably incidental to the discharge of his duties, the accident,
as a matter of law, was one which did not arise out of or in the
course of his employment.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT II. THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
DECEASED CONSTITUTED A SUBSTANTIAL DEVIATION FROM THE COURSE
OF HIS EMPLOYMENT.
Professor Larson notes that even where some reasonable
activity of an

empl~yee

may bring a period of time he spends

at the workplace after his normal hours within the course of
his employment, he may still "break the link with employment"
by engaging in a substantial deviation from the course of his
employment such as would render an accident during normal hours
uncompensable, lA Larson, supra, Sec. 21.60 at p.5-41.

And,

inasmuch as the deceased was engaging in play at the time of
his death, it is

~lso

useful to analyze the facts of this case

by application of the legal test for determining the compensa-

bility of horseplay which may be applied to injuries regardless
of when they occur.
In the case of Prows v. Industrial Comm'n. of Utah, 610 P.2d

1362 (Utah 1980) this court reviewed at length the factors which
should be considered in determining whether an injury which occurs during "horseplay" arises out of or in the course of employment within the meaning of Utah Code Ann.

(1953) Sec. 35-1-45.

The court adopted Professor Larson's view that horseplay should
be treated like other instances of deviation from the course of
ernployrnent;if the deviation is insignificant, the accident is
said to occur in the course of the worker's employment; if the
deviation is substantial a resultant accident is not compensable.
This court stated the test to be as follows:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Whether initiation of or participation
in horseplay is a deviation fromrcourse
of employment depends on (1) the extent
and seriousness of the deviation, (2) the
completeness of the deviation (i.e.,
whether it was commingled with the performance of duty or involved an abandonment of duty), (3) the extent to which
the practice of horseplay had become an
accepted part of the employment, and (4)
the extent to which the nature of the
employment may be expected to include
some such horseplay.
610 P.2d at 1365.

In the Prows case, the court applied this test to the
evidence and reversed the Commission's order denying benefits.
The claimant was employed to deliver medical supplies and
was injured when struck by a piece of wood shot at him with a
rubber band.

The evidence established that the deviation was

brief in duration, occurring during a lull in work activities,
and that it happened as the employee was otherwise properly engaged in moving medical supplies.

There was evidence that em-

ployees had engaged in rubber band fights with great frequency
prior to the

claiman~'s

accident, and the court concluded that

the ready accessibility of rubber bands and the nature of the
claimant's work loading and unloading supplies made it reasonable
to expect that horseplay of that kind would occur on the job.
The plaintiff respectfully contends that the four part test
of the Prows case, when applied to the facts of the case at bar,
establishes as a matter of law that the deceased had substantially deviated from the course of his employment at the time of his
death.
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(1)

Extent and seriousness of deviation.

The first part

of the Larson test as adopted in Prows focuses on the duration
of time involved in the horseplay and whether the conduct itself was a trivial or a substantial alteration of behavior from
that which is ordinarily incident to the performance of employment duties.

The court in Prows, supra, 610 P.2d at 1366 quoted

with approval Larson's statement that
The substantial character of ·a horseplay
deviation should not be judged by the
seriousness of its consequences in the
light of hindsight, but by the extent of
the work-departure in itself. This is
not always easy to do, especially when
a trifling incident escalates or explodes
into a major tragedy.
This court added its observation that,
We think the converse of this principle
is likewise true; the fact that a major
tragedy has occurred should not dictate
an award of compensation when that tragedy resulted from a deviation so extensive and serious that the employment
can be said to have been abandoned.
In contrast to the claimant in Prows who "momentarily set
aside his duties and took up the challenge",

(to engage in a rub-

ber band fight), 610 P.2d at 1366, the deceased in the case at
bar spent three quarters of an hour running around the bakery,
meddling with bake~y equipment, playing hide and seek, and drinking beer.

(R 61,70)

His activities were not simply a trivial

deviation from the normal work of a janitor but a serious departure from conduct which benefited his employer to conduct which
was exclusively for amusement, and extreme in the risks to his
safety which it created.

The plaintiff submits that, as a matter
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of law, the deceased's deviation from his duties at the time
of his death was serious and extensive.
(2) Completeness of the deviation.

The second prong of

the test concerns the extent to which the horseplay was "comingled with the performance of duty."

The court in Prows

noted that at the time the rubber band fight began, the claimant

was engaged in ·the discharge of his duties and that, had

he not been injured, "he would presumably have completed loading
the truck and carried on with his deliveries."

610 P.2d at 1366.

In contrast to the actions of the claimant in Prows, the
deceased in this case was finished with his work at the time of
his injury and had completely abandoned any performance of janitorial duties.

Had he not been injured he would not have resumed

his work, butwould have gone on to the Salt Palace to wait for
concert tickets.

There is no sense whatsoever in which it could

be said that his hide and seek game was "co-mingled with the perforrnance of duty. "

(3) Extent to which horseplay has become a part of the employrnent.

The court in Prows adopted Larson's explanation of

this factor that
The controlling issue is whether the custom
had in fact become a part of the employment; the employer's knowledge of it can make
it neither more nor less a part of the employment--at most it is evidence of incorporation of the practice into the employment.
(italics in original)
610 P.2d at 1336-1337.
In the case at bar, the applicant, whose burden it was to
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establish the compensability of his son's death, introduced no
evidence that horseplay such as occurred the night of the accident, that is, beer drinking,

h~de

and seek, and climbing in

mixers, had become a customary practice.

On the contrary, the

only evidence in the record on this issue is the testimony of
the deceased's employer and his two co-workers that no one had
ever been seen inside a mixer, and that the employees never before played hide and seek around the bakery.

As noted, the plain·,,

tiff also attempted to introduce evidence that beer drinking had
never before been observed on the job.

(R

41,42,65,67,70)

(4) Extent to which nature of employment may be expected to

include some such horseplay.
Explaining the final issue which arises under the Larson
test, the court in Prows stated that
This element of Larson's approach focuses
on the foreseeability of horseplay in any
given employment environment and on the particular act of horseplay involved. Considerations which may enter into the analysis
of this point include whether the work involves lulls in employment activity or is
essentially continuous, and the existence
of instrumentalities which are part of the
work environment and which are readily usable in horseplay situations. This list is
not intended to be exhaustive but rather
illustrative of the possibilities.
610 P.2d at 1367.

The appiicant introduced no evidence from which it could
be found that the kind of horseplay the deceased engaged in was
foreseeable.

The deceased's job was not one which involved lulls

such as are common for many workers who must wait for others to
complete certain tasks, or for certain events to occur, before
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they can continue with their duties.

The janitorial duties in-

valved here were continuous, according to the testimony of the
witnesses, requiring each worker to go about his cleaning assignment without necessary interruption or interrelation with
the performance of others.

(R

40)

Though the instrumentality of injury in this case was part
of the work of the deceased in the sense that the mixer was
cleaned by plaintiff's employees, it was never necessary to
climb into the mixer to clean it and both its size and the presence of an attached platform suggest that it was neither designed to be entered nor easily accessible for that purpose.
The fourth aspect of the test is the forseeability of the kind
of horseplay which resulted in injury and, unlike the universally
forseeable use of rubber bands as instruments of playful combat,
the evidence in this case is that no one could reasonably have
forseen that anyone would climb down into a mixer.
The Industrial Commission did not articulate any legal
theory by which it reached the conclusion that the applicant sustained his burden of proof in this matter.

The Commission stated

simply as its "finding of fact" the following legal conclusion:
In dealing with the issue of whether or not
the deceased was killed while in the course
and scope of his employment the contention
by the employer that the applicant was engaged in horseplay does not by itself defeat
the applicant's claim.
I have considered
this defense and while it is a close question
I find that the deceased, Jeffrey Tilt, was
killed while in the course and scope of his
employment with J & W Janitorial.
Plaintiff respectfully submits, however, that when the law
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of the Prows case is applied to the undisputed facts of this
case, the only reasonable conclusion is that the deceased was
not acting in the course of his employment when he died.
The plaintiff's position is further supported by the early
Utah case of Twin Peaks Canning Co. v. Industrial Com.m'n., 57
Utah 589, 196 Pac. 853 {1921) which also concerned the cornpensability of a death which occurred during horseplay.

In that case,

a fourteen year old boy was crushed when riding on the top of
an elevator cage which was mistakenly activated.

Though the

court did not articulate the legal standard announced later in
Prows, this court noted that the Twin Peaks decision was founded
on the same general principles, Prows, supra, 610 P.2d at 1365.
In Twin Peaks, supra, the court referred to the course of
employment issue as a close one, but resolved it in favor of compensability on the basis of evidence that,

{a) the deceased and

other children had frequently used and played on the elevator
in question;

{b) the accident occurred during a lunch break lull

in working hours, and {c) the propensity of children of the age
of the deceased to engage in unreasonable forms of horseplay made
it forseeable that an injury on the elevator should occur.

None

of the factors which the court in Twin Peaks considered to be
dispositive of the issue in favor of compensability are present
in the case at bar.
The plaintiff submits that the Industrial Commission misapplied the law when a majority of its members concluded that the
deceased died in an accident which arose out of or in the course
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of his employment.
POINT III. EVIDENCE THAT THE DECEASED
WAS DRINKING ALCOHOL AND USING DRUGS
AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH IS RELEVANT
TO. THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM THAT HE HAD
ABANDONED HIS EMPLOYMENT AT THE TIME
OF HIS ACCIDENT.
Plaintiff repeatedly posed questions to the co-workers of
the deceased about his use of alcohol and drugs at the time of
the accident.

The Administrative Law Judge sustained every ob-

jection from the Administrator of the Second Injury Fund to this
evidence though some of the answers of the witnesses to the questions propounded are part of the record.

(R

42,46,56-59,68,69)

The plaintiff respectfully submits that the Administrative
Law Judge erred in refusing_to consider plaintiff's evidence
that the deceased was drinking and using drugs at the time of
his death and further contends that this evidence substantiates
plaintiff's claim that the deceased was outside the course of
his employment when he died.
Professor Larson in his treatise, supra, at Vol lA Sec.
34.00, p.6-60 states the rule that,
Voluntary intoxication which renders an
employee incapable of performing his work
is a departure from the course of his employment.
Even in states like Utah where intoxication is not a bar to a
workmen's compensation recovery,

{Utah Code Ann.

(1953) Sec.

35-1-14 provides, instead, for a reduction in benefits where an
injured employee was intoxicated, except in cases of injury resulting in death) evidence of intoxication may establish that
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the claimant was unable to perform his employment duties at the
time of his accident, and so had abandoned the course of his employment.

Embre·e v. I':ndustrial Commission, 21 Ariz. App. 411,

520 P.2d 324 (1974); Steffes v. 93' Leasing Co., Inc., 580 P.2d
450 (Mont. 1978)
In cases where it is not asserted that an injured worker
was so intoxicated as to be totally unable to perform work related activities, evidence of drinking has been relied on by the
Industrial Commission and by this court, along with other circumstances, in resolving the question whether at the time of an accident an employee whose working hours are flexible was engaged
in work related activity or in purely social activity.

Those

cases include Martinson v. W-M rnsurance Co., 606 P.2d 256
(Utah 1980) where this court affirmed the Industrial Commission's
ruling that an insurance salesman's driving trip which resulted
in injury was a social excursion and not a part of his employment,
and Morley v. Industrial Commission, 23 Utah 2d 131, 459 P. 2d 212
(1969) when the court affirmed the Commission's rejection of a
construction company owner's claim that his accident after drinking beer at a bar was employment related.
Intoxication by alcohol is a defense to a claim for compensation benefits, as is intoxication by drugs, when i t results in
incapacity to perform job functions.

Furthermore, in any case

where the employer claims that an injured employee was not acting
in the course of his employment when he is injured, evidence of
drinking or using drugs, like evidence of all the worker's activi·"
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ties at the time of the accident is probative of the issue.
In this case, the testimony plaintiff sought to adduce further
substantiates

the obvious inference of other evidence,that be-

fore his death the deceased had totally abandoned activities related to his job and _was engaging in conduct which was neither
incidental nor related in any way to performance of those duties.
CONCLUSION
The tragedy of Jeffrey Matthew Tilt's death cannot be overstated.

However, as this court has observed, it is not the ser-

iousness of the consequences of an employee's activities by which
their relation to his employment is measured, but by application
of principles of law which define the contour of the employment
relationship.
The death of an employee is compensable under Utah workmen's
compensation law if it occurs as the result of the performance
of his duties or activities reasonably related to his duties,
United States Steel Corp. v. Draper, supra.

The fact that an

accident happens after normal working hours does not mean that
it is outside the protection of the compensation act if a worker
is engaged in activities reasonably incidental to his employment
duties.

The fact that an injury occurs as the result of horse-

play does not relieve an employer of liablity if the employee
engaged in only a minor deviation from his employment.
When the law is applied to the uncontested facts of this
case, however, the conclusion is inescapable that Mr. Tilt's
death did not arise out of or in the course of his employment.
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He remained at the bakery after hours for purely personal reasons and for a period of forty five minutes engaged in a form
o~

horseplay which was completely disassociated from his duties,

extremely hazardous and highly out of the ordinary.

His use of

drugs and alcohol is a relevant factor in assessing his legal
status at the time of the accident and further substantiates
the plaintiff's contention that he had abandoned his employment
at the time of his accident.
The plaintiff respectfully requests that the court reverse
the decision of the Industrial Commission.
DATED this

- - -day

of May, 1982.

I

TIMOTHY C. H PT
Attorney for Plaintiff

l
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